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NOTES
COPYING AND BROADCASTING VIDEO AND
AUDIO TAPE EVIDENCE: A THREAT TO THE
FAIR TRIAL RIGHT
INTRODUCTION
The public and the press have a common-law right to inspect and
copy public records.' With respect to criminal court records,2 this
right is most often exercised by the press to enable the public to
monitor the workings of its government's judicial branch.3 In 1980,
1. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Ex parte
Uppercu, 239 U.S. 435, 439-40 (1915); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d
423, 429 (5th Cir. 1981); In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 612 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981); United States
v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 949 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293,
314 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Sloan Filter Co. v. El Paso Reduction Co., 117 F. 504, 506-07
(C.C.D. Colo. 1902); Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404, 407-08 (D.C. Cir.
1894); In re McLean, 16 F. Cas. 237, 239 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1879) (No. 8,877); United
States v. Carpentier (Carpentier II), 526 F. Supp. 292, 294-95 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);
United States v. Ming Sen Shiue, 504 F. Supp. 360, 361 (D. Minn. 1980); In re
Mosher, 248 F.2d 956, 958-59 (C.C.P.A. 1957); In re Sackett, 136 F.2d 248, 249
(C.C.P.A. 1943); C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1974); United States v. Burka,
289 A.2d 376, 379 (D.C. 1972); Schmedding v. May, 85 Mich. 1, 4-5, 48 N.W. 201,
202 (1891); Werfel v. Fitzgerald, 23 A.D.2d 306, 308-09, 260 N.Y.S.2d 791, 794-95
(1965); North v. Foley, 238 A.D. 731, 733, 265 N.Y.S. 780, 782 (1933); State ex rel.
Williston Herald, Inc. v. O'Connell, 151 N.W.2d 758, 762-63 (N.D. 1967); In re
CasweU, 18 R.I. 835, 835, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893); see H. Cross, The People's Right to
Know 25-37, 55-56 (1953); 1 S. Greenleaf, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence §§
471-473 (12th ed. Boston 1866). There are also statutes that grant a right to inspect
and copy public records, but some, such as the federal Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. I 1978), expressly exclude court records from their
coverage. Id. § 552(e). State courts have held that court records are excluded from
the coverage of statutes granting access to public records. E.g., Sanford v. Boston
Herald-Traveler Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 157-58, 61 N.E.2d 5, 6 (1945); Grand Forks
Herald, Inc. v. Lyons, 101 N.W.2d 543, 545 (N.D. 1960).
2. Most judicial records are considered to be public records. See Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975); State ex rel. Holloran v. McGrath, 104 Mont. 490,
497, 67 P.2d 838, 841 (1937); North v. Foley, 238 A.D. 731, 733, 265 N.Y.S. 780, 782
(1933); H. Cross, supra note 1, at 136. Some judicial records are not open to public
inspection, either because of statute or the trial judge's discretion. Id. at 143-52.
3. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (plu-
rality opinion); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. 435 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1978);
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863
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the Supreme Court in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia4 held
that the public has a first amendment right to attend criminal trials,5
and thus arguably elevated the correlative right to inspect to constitu-
tional status. 6 Two years earlier, however, in Nixon v. Warner Com-
munications, Inc., 7 the Supreme Court had held that the first amend-
ment does not protect the right to copy all judicial records. 8 Rather,
the Court concluded that the common-law right to copy provides
merely a presumption, "however gauged," in favor of copying judicial
records.0 It is the tension between the right to copy and the right of
the accused to a fair trial that has been the center of controversy in the
cases involving the press's requests for the release of the Abscam 10 and
Brilab" tapes.
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965); Medico v.
Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 141 (3d Cir. 1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus., No. 74-2451, slip op. at 65 (E.D. Pa. Dee. 10, 1981); United States v.
Ming Sen Shiue, 504 F. Supp. 360, 361 (D. Minn. 1980); Sanford v. Boston Herald-
Traveler Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 159, 61 N.E.2d 5, 7 (1945); Cowley v, Pulsifer, 137
Mass. 392, 394 (1884).
4. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
5. Id. at 580 (plurality opinion).
6. See id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v, Clark,
654 F.2d 423, 427-29 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 820-22
(3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Carpentier (Carpentier II), 526 F. Supp. 292, 294-95
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
7. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
8. Id. at 608-10.
9. Id. at 602.
10. Abscam is a coined word derived from the joining of the first two letters of
Abdul Enterprises, Ltd., a fictitious entity represented by undercover F.B.I. agents,
and the word "scam," which means a swindle or sting operation. The videotapes
involved, surreptitiously made by the F.B.I., show the defendants discussing with the
agents their willingness to take a bribe and, in some cases, actually taking the bribe.
For a good summary of the facts of the Abscam cases, see United States v. Myers, 635
F.2d 945, 947-48 (2d Cir. 1980). Myers cites the seven prosecutions resulting from the
Abscam investigations: United States v. Jenrette, No. Cr-80-00289 (D.D.C.); United
States v. Kelly, No. Cr-80-00340 (D.D.C.); United States v. Criden, No. 80-166
(E.D. Pa.); United States v. Thompson, No. Cr-80-00291 (E.D.N.Y.); United States
v. Lederer, No. Cr-80-00253 (E.D.N.Y.); United States v. Myers, No. Cr-80-00249
(E.D.N.Y.); and United States v. Carpentier, No. Cr-80-00102 (E.D.N.Y.). This
Note discusses Myers, Jenrette, Criden and Carpentier, in which the issue of the
release of the tapes was extensively analyzed. The case involving the release of the
Watergate tapes is also discussed in this Note. The Watergate case, United States v.
Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977), was the
trial of five defendants for their involvement with the break-in of the Democratic
National Committee Headquarters in June of 1972 and the subsequent cover-up. The
tapes recorded conversations that took place in the Oval Office of the White House.
Id. at 57-59.
11. Brilab, an acronym that results from the joining of the words bribery and
labor, is the name of another F.B.I. sting operation involving alleged bribery in the
awarding of state employee insurance contracts, wherein audio tapes recorded the
conversations between the defendants and the F.B.I. agents. In Belo Broadcasting
(Vol. 50
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Made in the course of government sting operations, these tapes
revealed the defendants either discussing or committing the acts for
which they were tried.'2 The tapes were played to the jury in open
court,13 and members of the press and public attended and were often
allowed to follow along with court-furnished transcripts.4 The tran-
scripts were subsequently reproduced in whole or in part in the print
media.' 5 Television and radio networks sought to copy the tapes in
order to broadcast them to the public.'8 They argued that the public,
by actually hearing and seeing the tapes, could gain knowledge that
would not be obtained by merely reading the transcripts.17  The
requests to copy were usually opposed either by the defendants at
whose trial the tapes were introduced into evidence or by persons
Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981), the Fifth Circuit decided not to release
these tapes to the media for copying.
12. See Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1981); In
re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 947 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Carpentier (Carpentier II),
526 F. Supp. 292, 293 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854,
855 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981); cf. United States v.
Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 58 & n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Watergate case), cert. denicd,
431 U.S. 933 (1977).
13. All those in attendance at the Watergate, Abscam and Brilab trials were
allowed to view or listen to the tapes. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d
423, 427 (5th Cir. 1981); In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 611 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d Cir. 1981); United States
v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 948 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252,
1255 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub non. Nixon v. Warner Communi-
cations, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); United States v. Carpentler (Carpentler I), No.
Cr-80-00102, slip op. at 1 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1980). The tapes introduced into
evidence during Carpentier's sentencing hearing were not played In open court.
United States v. Carpentier (Carpentier II), 526 F. Supp. 292, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
14. See Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Mitchell,
551 F.2d 1252, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). But see In re National Broad-
casting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (transcripts of audio, but not video,
tapes furnished); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 948 (2d Cir. 1980) (tran-
scripts furnished to members of press only).
15. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 427 (5th Cir. 1981); United
States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Mitchell, 551
F.2d 1252, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
16. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1981); In re
National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 815-16 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945,
948 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S.
589 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 602 (1978);
United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980).
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implicated by the tapes who were under indictment and awaiting
trial. 18 The primary argument against release of the tapes is that
their broadcast would severely impair the chance of those implicated
to receive a fair trial.' 9 The rationale for this argument is that the
broadcast of the tapes on radio and television is likely to reach more
jurors and potential jurors and to leave a greater impression than
printed publication of transcripts.
2 0
These and other 21 tapes cases have forced courts to consider
whether Richmond created a constitutional right to inspect and
18. In the Watergate tapes case, the application to copy was opposed In the
district court by former President Nixon. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252,
1254 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nort. Nixon v. Warner Communi-
cations, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). When the case was appealed to the court of
appeals, defendant H.R. Haldeman joined Nixon in opposing the request. Id. at 1262
n.47. The United States attorneys submitted a memorandum stating that the govern-
ment did not believe unfairness to the defendant would result if the tapes were
released for copying. They maintained, however, that "since the extent of the
dissemination of these tape recordings or the manner in which they will be repro-
duced and broadcast is entirely speculative at present, the government is unable to
conclude with certainty that large-scale commercial reproduction and sale of the
tapes would have no impact on the venire at a retrial." Memo of Appellee United
States at 2, United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978),
reprinted in Petition for Writ of Certiorari app. R, Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In the first Abscam tapes case, United States v.
Myers, 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980), the application to copy the tapes was opposed by
defendants Myers, Errichetti, Johanson and Criden. Id. at 946. Errichetti was facing
one other indictment, Johanson two others and Criden three. Id. at 947-48. The
government in this case did not oppose the release of the tapes for copying, but
suggested that in the event of release sequestration of the jury would be necessary to
secure a fair trial. Id. at 953 n.8. In the second Abscam tapes case, United States v.
Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981), defendants Janotti and Schwartz and indictee
Criden opposed the request, and the government made no appearance. Id. at 815,
817. In the third Abscam tapes case, In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609
(D.C. Cir. 1981), only defendant Jenrette opposed the application to copy the tapes.
Id. at 610. The government had originally supported the application, but because
Jenrette commenced a civil suit against it, that support was withdrawn. Id, at 611
n.5. In the Brilab tapes case, Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423 (5th
Cir. 1981), only defendant Clark opposed the copying request. Id. at 425. The
Special Prosecutor of the Watergate cases expressed a concern that televised Senate
hearings on the matter "might prejudice future criminal trials." S. Rep. No. 981, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. XXXII (1974).
19. See Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 431 (5th Cir. 1981); In
re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 615-16 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States
v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 826-27 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d
945, 952-53 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. See In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 824 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers,
635 F.2d 945, 953 (2d Cir. 1980).
21, E.g., In re Griffin Television, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1947 (W.D. Okla. July
22, 1981); In re Kansas City Star Co., 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1689 (W.D. Mo. July
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whether that right encompasses the right to copy. While the press has
strenuously maintained that Richmond has set up a constitutional
right to copy,22 most of the recent cases have followed Nixon in
holding that the right to copy is merely a common-law right. These
courts have then had to gauge the strength of the presumption in favor
of the common-law right to copy, but have disagreed over the impor-
tance of the right to copy when balanced against the accused's right to
a fair trial. While two courts have concluded that the risk to a fair
trial, although only speculative, was enough to deny the copying of
the tapes,2 4 the others have decided that the potential for prejudice
was not sufficient to deny the right to copy.25
This Note discusses the differences between the right to inspect and
the right to copy information for republication. The importance of the
right to a fair trial is viewed in light of the potentially great prejudi-
cial effect of the wide dissemination of non-documentary records such
as video and audio tapes. This Note argues that the presumption in
favor of immediate2 6 access to copy judicial records should not apply
15, 1981), vacated on other grounds, No. 81-1744 (8th Cir. Dec. 14, 1981); United
States v. Dean, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1405 (S.D. Ga. May 19, 1981); United States
v. Reiter, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1927 (D. Md. May 12, 1981); United States v.
Haimowitz, 7 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1111 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 1981); United States v.
Ming Sen Shiue, 504 F. Supp. 360 (D. Minn. 1980); cf. Guarriello v. Benson, 90 N.J.
Super. 233, 217 A.2d 22 (Law Div. 1966) (audio tape of municipal hearing); Ortiz v.
Jaramillo, 82 N.M. 445, 483 P.2d 500 (1971) (magnetic computer tape); Hearst
Corp. v. Vogt, 62 A.D.2d 840, 406 N.Y.S.2d 567 (1978) (photographs).
22. See, e.g., Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 426-29 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Carpentier (Carpentier II), 526 F. Supp. 292, 294-95
(E.D.N.Y. 1981). The press in United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981),
did not argue that Richmond set up a constitutional right to copy, but the court
suggested that the policy considerations identified by Richmond that support open
trials also support the right of the public to copy the tapes. Id. at 820-22.
23. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1981); In re
National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v.
Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 949
(2d Cir. 1980).
24. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 431-33 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Marcello, No. 80-274, slip op. at 5 (E.D. La. Dec. 1, 1981).
25. See, e.g., In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 616 (D.C. Cir.
1981); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 954 (2d Cir. 1980). Interestingly, the district court judges in
both Criden and National Broadcasting had denied the applications to copy because
of the risks of unfairness to the defendants, but were reversed on appeal. See In re
National Broadcasting Co., No. 80-260 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1980), rev'd, 653 F.2d 609
(D.C. Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd,
648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981).
26. The terms "immediate" or "contemporaneous" access do not necessarily im-
ply copying simultaneous with the playing of the tapes in court, but rather copying
within a reasonable time thereafter, such as at the end of each trial day. See United
States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 952 n.7 (2d Cir. 1980). Those opposed to the copying
1982]
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to these non-documentary records. Rather, it concludes that courts
should, as a matter of law, deny applications to copy tapes until all
risk of prejudice has passed.
I. CONFLICTING RIGHTS
A. The Right to Inspect and the Right to Copy
Crucial to the resolution of the issues in cases involving non-docu-
mentary records has been the distinction between "access" to the
information contained on the records and "physical access" to the
records themselves for the purpose of copying. This distinction has
been blurred by the imprecise use of these and other terms. The
constitutional right to the information has been variously termed as
the right to know,2 7 the right of access, 2 3 or the right to gather
information.2 9 The right emanates from the free speech and free
press clauses of the first amendment. 30  It can be satisfied, with
respect to information regarding criminal trials, by permitting the
public to attend the trial31 or to inspect the records of the open
proceeding.32 The right of physical access to the records for the
purpose of copying is distinguishable, however, because it is not a
means by which the first amendment right is satisfied. 33 No informa-
tion is gathered through copying that could not be obtained through
attendance or inspection. It is rather a physical act of duplicating
have argued that copying should be denied until the trial is completed or while an
appeal is still pending. See, e.g., Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423,
431 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 826 (3d Cir. 1981);
United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 953 (2d Cir. 1980).
27. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 541 (1965); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d
814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981).
28. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (plurality
opinion); id. at 583 (Stevens, J., concurring); Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978); In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 614
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
29. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980) (plurality
opinion); id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972).
30. U.S. Const. amend. I, construed in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality opinion); id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). But cf. Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) ("newsmen have no constitutional right of access
to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public").
31. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (plurality
opinion).
32. City of St. Matthews v. Voice of St. Matthews, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 811, 815
(Ky. 1974); Newton v. Fisher, 98 N.C. 20, 22, 3 S.E. 822, 823 (1887); see ICC v.
Gould, 629 F.2d 847, 854 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1077 (1981).
33. See United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d Cir. 1981) (distinguishing
the issue of the right to copy from the rights to attend a trial and to inspect records).
(Vol. 50
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information to allow dissemination in a particular form. 3  This dis-
tinction was not accorded legal significance until the propriety of
copying video or audio tapes introduced into evidence at criminal
trials became an issue, starting with Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions, Inc.35  Prior to Nixon, the right to copy had usually been
treated as coextensive with, or as included in, the right to inspect.36 In
fact, it had been held that without the right to copy, the right to
inspect is meaningless.
37
The common-law rights to inspect and copy public records first
developed in England. 38 Except for access to the records of the King's
courts, which was considered to be the right of every subject, 39 access
to most records was restricted to those with a sufficient interest in
them. 40 The interest usually required was the need to use the docu-
ments in the bringing or defense of a legal action. 41
In the United States, however, while the same limitation on access
was often noted,42 it was rarely followed.4 3 Most jurisdictions held
34. United States v. Ming Sen Shiue, 504 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Minn. 1980).
35. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
36. United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 823 (3d Cir. 1981); e.g., Whorton v.
Gaspard, 239 Ark. 715, 716, 393 S.W.2d 773, 774 (1965); People ex rl. Gibson v.
Peller, 34 IMl. App. 2d 372, 374, 181 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1962); Ortiz v. ]aramillo, 82
N.M. 445, 446, 483 P.2d 500, 501 (1971); see H. Cross, supra note 1, at 34; 1 S.
Greenleaf, supra note 1, § 471. When the right to inspect is statutory, it similarly
includes the right to copy. See Fuller v. State ex rel. O'Donnell, 154 Fla. 368, 369, 17
So. 2d 607, 607 (1944); Boylan v. Warren, 39 Kan. 301, 307, 18 P. 174, 177 (1888);
Direct-Mail Serv. v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 296 Mass. 353, 356-57, 5 N.E.2d
545, 546-47 (1937); Becker v. Lunn, 200 A.D. 178, 180, 192 N.Y.S. 754, 756 (1922);
Clay v. Ballard, 87 Va. 787, 791, 13 S.E. 262, 263 (1891).
37. Whorton v. Gaspard, 239 Ark. 715, 716, 393 S.\V.2d 773, 774 (1965); see
State ex rel. Colscott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 629, 57 N.E. 535, 538-39 (1900).
38. For a good discussion of English cases on the issues of inspecting and copying
public records, see State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 334-38 (Sup. Ct.
1879).
39. 1 S. Greenleaf, supra note 1, § 471. This was true because all subjects of the
King had an interest in those records.
40. Id. § 473.
41. H. Cross, supra note 1, at 25-26.
42. See, e.g., State ex rel. Holloran v. McGrath, 104 Mont. 490, 497, 67 P.2d
838, 841 (1937); North v. Foley, 238 A.D. 731, 733, 265 N.Y.S. 780, 782 (1933). In
Nowack v. Auditor General, 243 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928), the court, after
noting this limitation, argued that it was merely a declaration of the interest one
needed before a court will enforce a right to inspect. Id. at 204-05, 219 N.V. at 750.
Thus, "[a]s a citizen and taxpayer, [a person seeking access] had the right of inspec-
tion; but, when he wanted to use it for private purposes, his right was restricted by
the limited remedy [i.e., mandamus] which the courts allowed him for its enforce-
ment." Id. at 206, 219 N.W. at 751. According to Nowack, when the citizen sought
to inspect records, an "absurd" distinction was made between purposes that were
litigation related and those that were not. Id.
43. 1 S. Greenleaf, supra note 1, § 471; see State ex tel. Colscott v. King, 154
Ind. 621, 628-29, 57 N.E. 535, 538 (1900); Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich. 363, 374, 44
N.W. 282, 285 (1889).
5571982]
558 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
that a person who was a citizen and a taxpayer had 'enough of an
interest in public records to be granted access to them, provided his
motivation was proper. 44  Today, most jurisdictions presumptively
allow access regardless of motivation, 45 leaving the decision to the
discretion of the trial court. 40  The practical effect of this common-
law presumption is that any reasonable request to copy a document in
a criminal case file has been granted as a matter of course. 47 In the
44. See, e.g., C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 723 (Del. 1974); Nowack v. Auditor
General, 243 Mich. 200, 208, 219 N.W. 749, 751 (1928); State ex rel. Ferry v.
Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 336 (Sup. Ct. 1879); State ex rel. Williston Herald, Inc. v.
O'Connell, 151 N.W.2d 758, 762 (N.D. 1967); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 835, 29 A.
259, 259 (1893); Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 318, 63 A. 146, 153-54 (1906);
Payne v. Staunton, 55 W. Va. 202, 213, 46 S.E. 927, 932 (1904).
45. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 602 (1978);
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 823 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers,
635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus.,
No. 74-2451, slip op. at 64 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 1981); People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller,
34 Ill. App. 2d 372, 374-75, 181 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1962); Werfel v. Fitzgerald, 23
A.D.2d 306, 312, 260 N.Y.S.2d 791, 798 (1965). Some jurisdictions have for quite
some time been very liberal in granting access to their records. E.g., Ex parte
Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 1894); Burton v. Tuite, 78 Mich.
363, 374, 44 N.W. 282, 295 (1889); Stenstrom v. Harnett, 131 Misc. 75, 77, 226
N.Y.S. 338, 341 (1927), aff'd, 224 A.D. 127, 230 N.Y.S. 28, af'd, 249 N.Y. 606, 164
N.E. 602 (1928); Newton v. Fisher, 98 N.C. 20, 22-23, 3 S.E. 822, 823 (1887).
46. See, e.g., Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 429-31 (5th Cir.
1981); In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1981); C. v.
C., 320 A.2d 717, 724 (Del. 1974); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332, 339
(Sup. Ct. 1879); State ex rel. Wellford v. Williams, 110 Tenn. 549, 595, 75 S.W, 948,
959 (1903). In Nixon, however, the Court did not specifically state that the decision
was strictly discretionary and subject only to limited appellate review. Rather, the
Court only said that "[tjhe few cases that have recognized such a right do agree that
the decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial court." 435
U.S. at 599. Later in the opinion, however, after listing the arguments in favor of
and against copying the Watergate tapes, the Court stated that "[a]t this point, we
normally would be faced with the task of weighing the interests advanced by the
parties." Id. at 602 (emphasis added). Thus, it is not clear whether the decision of the
trial judge was solely discretionary or whether a more liberal appellate review was
justified. See United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 950 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980). The Third
Circuit in United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981), held that the
decision as to copying was discretionary not because it was dependent on the first-
hand observations of the trial judge but because there were no clear rules formulated
that could apply to the many fact patterns that might arise. Thus, the court justified
a somewhat more liberal appellate review. Id. at 818; accord In re National Broad-
casting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But see Belo Broadcasting Corp. v.
Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 431 n.18 (5th Cir. 1981). In light of the conclusion arrived at in
this Note-that courts should as a matter of law deny the release of tapes in evi-
dence-the decision regarding the immediate release of the tapes should not be
discretionary.
47. United States v. Mitchell, 386 F. Supp. 639, 641 (D.D.C. 1974). With
respect to all judicial records, however, if the proceeding itself was closed to the
public, then not only the right to copy, but also the right to inspect, can be denied.
See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 392-93 (1979); C. v. C., 320 A.2d
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past few years, however, requests to cop), tapes in a criminal case file
have not been granted so readily.
Nixon is the leading case making the legal distinction between the
right to inspect and the right to copy. The question presented in that
case was whether copies of audio tapes that had been introduced into
evidence and played at an open criminal trial should be made avail-
able to the press for broadcast. 48 The press argued that the common-
law right to copy 49 and, alternatively, the first amendment-" required
the release of the tapes.
In dismissing the first amendment claim, Justice Powell, writing for
the majority, distinguished the two rights. After indicating that the
amount of access to the tapes that had already been allowed was
great, Justice Powell wrote:
There is no question [here] of a truncated flow of information to
the public. Thus, the issue presented in this case is not whether the
press must be permitted access to public information to which the
public generally is guaranteed access, but whether these copies of
the White House tapes-to which the public has never had physical
access-must be made available for copying.51
The Supreme Court's use of the phrase "physical access" has been
interpreted to apply either to copying alone 52 or to both inspection
and copying.53 Given the narrow issue presented in the case, which
Justice Powell stated was the extent of the press's right to copy tapes,5
the phrase is best interpreted as applying to copying alone. The tapes
were played in open court and heard by members of the press and
717, 722-23 (Del. 1974); News-Press Publishing Co. v. State, 345 So. 2d 865, 867
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Schmedding v. May, 85 Mich. 1, 5, 48 N.W. 201, 202
(1891); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 836, 29 A. 259, 259 (1893). In Crystal Grower's
Corp. v. Dobbins, 616 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1980), while oral argument on the appeal
was open to the public, the information that was being sought by the petitioner was
not brought out in open court, and therefore the court ordered the sealing of
documents containing that information. Id. at 462. The more difficult question is
whether the courts may seal records containing information that was brought out in
open court. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
48. 435 U.S. at 591.
49. Brief for Respondent National Broadcasting Co. at 18, Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
50. Id. at 33.
51. 435 U.S. at 609.
52. E.g., Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 427-29 (5th Cir.
1981); United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 859 (E.D. Pa. 1980), revd, 648
F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981).
53. E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., No. 74-2451, slip op. at
110 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 1981); Stephens v. Van Arsdale, 227 Kan. 676, 686-87, 608
P.2d 972, 980-81 (1980); see Comment, All Courts Shall Be Open: The Public's Right
to View Judicial Proceedings and Records, 52 Temple L.Q. 311, 340 (1979) [herein-
after cited as All Courts].
54. 435 U.S. at 591.
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public in attendance. Therefore, the public's right to inspect for the
purpose of gathering information was satisfied.55 As the Court noted,
there was no restriction on the flow of information to the public. r3
The Court, in bifurcating the two rights, indicated that the right to
copy these tapes was not as important as the right to have the informa-
tion that was contained on them.57 At least with respect to tapes, the
former was deemed not to be a constitutional right, but rather only a
common-law right that merely raises a presumption in favor of copy-
ing. 58 The Court strongly implied, however, that there is some infor-
mation to which access, and therefore inspection, is "guaranteed" to
the public. 59 Decided only two years later, Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia 6 provided further support for this inference.
55. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. Of course, there is no guarantee
that every member of the public must be permitted to inspect. Cf. 435 U.S. at 610
("The requirement of a public trial is satisfied by the opportunity of members of the
public and the press to attend the trial and to report what they have observed.").
56. 435 U.S. at 609.
57. Nixon was not the first case that recognized the different interests that are
involved in the two rights. In Guarriello v. Benson, 90 N.J. Super. 233, 217 A.2d 22
(Law Div. 1966), the court denied a petition to copy tapes of hearings held by the
Township Committee of Wyckoff, New Jersey. The court concluded that the Com-
mittee's policy of allowing the inspection but denying the copying of the tapes was
reasonable. There was no attempt to thwart the public's right to know, argued the
court, and the copies of the tapes could be easily altered. Id. at 241, 217 A.2d at 27;
accord Newton v. Fisher, 98 N.C. 20, 22-23, 3 S.E. 822, 823 (1887) (allowing
petitioner to inspect all land transfer records of the county but denying him the right
to make copies of those records in which he did not have a present interest).
58. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
59. 435 U.S. at 609, quoted supra text accompanying note 51. In the court of
appeals decision, United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589
(1978), the court noted that "[a] serious question exists as to whether sealing tran-
scripts of proceedings held in open court or exhibits displayed in open court is ever
justifiable. We have found no cases in which an attempt has been made to do so." Id.
at 1260-61. Two years later, the Hawaii Supreme Court upheld a trial judge's
decision to seal a transcript of a preliminary criminal hearing that had been open.
Honolulu Advertiser, Inc. v. Takao, 59 Hawaii 237, 580 P.2d 58 (1978). The reason
for doing so was a fear that dissemination of that transcript would create a substan-
tial likelihood that the defendant would be unable to receive a fair trial. The
Supreme Court of Hawaii reviewed only for an abuse of discretion and found none.
id. at 240, 580 P.2d at 61-62. Prior to Nixon, it had been held that "[l]f the
proceedings must be public, then the same is true of the record," United States v.
Burka, 289 A.2d 376, 379 (D.C. 1972); see Ex parte Drawbaugh, 2 App. D.C. 404,
407-08 (D.C. Cir. 1894); In re Sackett, 136 F.2d 248, 249 (C.C.P.A. 1943). Several
courts, when deciding whether or not to seal the record of a case, have discussed the
propriety of closing the trials themselves. E.g., United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d
293, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1209 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); News-Press Publishing Co. v. State, 345 So.
2d 865, 867 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Collazo, 329
So. 2d 333, 336-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Cohen v. Everett City Council, 85
Wash. 2d 385, 387-89, 535 P.2d 801, 803 (1975) (en bane). These courts implicitly
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In Richmond, the Court was asked for the first time to decide
whether the first amendment guaranteed the public the right to at-
tend criminal trials .6  The Court noted that the traditional openness
of criminal trials 62 served to enlighten the public regarding the judi-
cial system, 63 to protect the accused from injustice 4 and to provide a
community cathartic effect in cleansing society of the criminal.65 A
majority of the Court agreed that such a right was implicitly guaran-
teed in the free speech and free press clauses of the first amend-
ment.66  The plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger concluded
that, absent overriding interests, criminal trials must be open.Y1 He
equated open trials and open records, and presumably would agree with Burka that
if the courtroom is open, so also are the records. See also 2 T. Cooley, A Treatise on
the Constitutional Limitations 931-32 (8th ed. 1927) ("The [members of the] public
are permitted to attend nearly all judicial inquiries, and there appears to be no
sufficient reason why they should not also be allowed to see in print the reports of
trials."). At least two other courts had hinted prior to Nixon that the right to inspect
the court's files was included in first amendment guarantees. Northwest Publications,
Inc. v. Anderson, 259 N.W.2d 254, 257 (Minn. 1977); Davis v. Davis, 107 N.Y.S.2d
460, 461 (Sup. Ct. 1951), af-'d, 279 A.D. 865, 110 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1952); cf. Alexan-
der v. National Farmers Org., 405 F. Supp. 118, 121 (W.D. Mo. 1975) (because
reporter can report what transpires in the courtroom, he may also report pleadings
and other data found in the court files).
60. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
61. Id. at 563-64 (plurality opinion). Only one year earlier in Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), the Court had to decide whether either the first or
the sixth amendment guaranteed the public a right to attend pre-trial criminal
hearings. The Court first reaffirmed its position that the sixth amendment guaran-
teed only the accused a public trial, and therefore it could not be the basis by which
the public obtained an open hearing. Id. at 385-87. Then the Court stated that
whether or not the first amendment guaranteed an open hearing was irrelevant,
because even if it did, that guarantee was outweighed in that case by the concern of
all the trial participants that an open hearing could endanger the accused's right to a
fair trial. Id. at 391-93.
62. 448 U.S. at 564-69 (plurality opinion).
63. Id. at 572-73 (plurality opinion).
64. Id. at 569 (plurality opinion).
65. Id. at 570-72 (plurality opinion). A community catharsis occurs when the
public's yearning to see justice done is satisfied. Because an open trial serves as an
outlet for community concern, hostility and emotion, it has significant therapeutic
value. Id.
66. Id. at 580 (plurality opinion). Justices White and Stevens concurred with
Chief Justice Burger in the plurality opinion. Justice Brennan, with whom Justice
Marshall agreed, concurred in the result only, but in his separate opinion, he stated
that he also "believe[d] that the First Amendment. . .secures such a public right of
access [to trial proceedings]." Id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
Similarly, Justice Stewart agreed that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly
give the press and the public a right of access to trials." Id. at 599 (Stewart, I.,
concurring in the judgment).
67. Id. at 581 (plurality opinion).
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went on to point out that this right could also be called a "right to
gather information" or a "right of access." '6 8 Although the Court did
not expressly address the issue, it is reasonable to infer that the right to
inspect judicial records is a first amendment right as well;00 inspec-
tion, which complements the right to attend, 0 is also a method of
gathering information. 71 The right to copy those records, however,
was denied constitutional status in Nixon, and while it remains an
important right, it is less significant than the right to inspect.
B. The Right to a Fair Trial
The primary obstacle to the free exercise of the rights to inspect and
copy criminal court records is the accused's guarantee of a fair trial.
The sixth amendment provides that "[l~n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
68. Id. at 576 (plurality opinion).
69. In the short time since Nixon and Richmond, only a few courts have discussed
the applicability of these two Supreme Court decisions to the right to inspect criminal
court files. The district court in United States v. Carpentier (Carpentier II), 526 F.
Supp. 292 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), has been the only one expressly to extend the holding of
Richmond to the inspection of judicial records. Faced with a government application
to seal videotapes that had been introduced into evidence but not played in open
court, District Judge Costantino ruled that "the public has a strong First Amendment
claim to access to evidence admitted in a public sentencing hearing. . . and . . . the
tapes should be disclosed." Id. at 294-95. The court in United States v. Criden, 648
F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981), discussed Richmond at length when faced with the request
of the broadcast media to copy tapes introduced into evidence. At one point in that
discussion, the court grouped together the rights to attend a trial and to inspect the
files as distinct from the right to copy. Id. at 822. The implication was that the first
two rights, while different manifestations of the right to gather information, are
rights of equal stature. Finally, in Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423
(5th Cir. 1981), when faced with a request similar to that made in Criden, the court
stated very clearly that "[c]onstitutional requirements are fully satisfied by . . .
untrammeled access to the information contained [on the tapes]." Id. at 427.
70. See All Courts, supra note 53, at 338. It is logical to say that the right to
attend a trial encompasses the right to inspect because the former would seem to be a
greater entitlement than the latter. Given the choice between the right to attend or
the right to inspect, a newsgatherer would surely choose the right to attend. See 448
U.S. at 597 n.22 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). But see State ex rel.
Williston Herald, Inc. v. O'Connell, 151 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1967), in which the
petitioner newspaper preferred, because of the expenses involved, to inspect the files
after proceedings had been completed rather than have its reporter be present at the
actual trial. Id. at 760. The court did not view the issue as one involving
newsgathering: "This proceeding involves, therefore, not so much the right of the
petitioner to secure the information it seeks as it does the method of getting such
information. The petitioner's contention that this proceeding involves the public's
'right to know' is not entirely accurate, since it involves only the method by which It
is to gain its knowledge." Id. This distinction is erroneous because attending a trial Is
also a way of gathering information. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 50
BROADCASTING TAPE EVIDENCE
impartial jury."'17 2 This right has been labelled the most "fundamen-
tal" right of our constitutional system 73 and its guarantee termed
"absolute."-74 It is thus the duty of the trial judge to preserve this
right for the defendant. 75 Not only does this duty include countering
the effects of preexisting prejudice, but also preventing "the probabil-
ity of unfairness."76  In assessing the fairness of a trial, the appellate
court should consider the degree to which it was public. 7 The "glare
of publicity"' 78 on a trial will result in close public scrutiny of the legal
process, so that should any impropriety occur, the outraged public
conscience will demand a correction. 71
The right to a fair trial also requires that the jury be impartial.
Ironically, one of the greatest threats to the impartiality of the jury is
excessive publicity. When a defendant appeals a conviction on the
ground that he did not receive a fair trial, the appellate court will
review the record to determine whether actual bias or prejudice ex-
isted in the mind of any juror.8 0 If it can be shown that a juror was
predisposed concerning the guilt of the accused, 8' or had received so
72. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
73. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965); see United States v. Criden, 648
F.2d 814, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 1975).
74. Johnson v. Johnson, 375 F. Supp. 872, 875 (W.D. Mich. 1974); McIntosh v.
Commonwealth, 368 S.W.2d 331, 336 (Ky. 1963).
75. See infra notes 92, 176 and accompanying text.
76. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); accord United States v. Gurney,
558 F.2d 1202, 1209-10 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); United
States v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 497 F.2d 102, 104 (5th Cir. 1974).
77. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965); Oxnard Publishing Co. v.
Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83, 90 (Ct. App. 1968).
78. Sanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 159, 61 N.E.2d 5,
7 (1945).
79. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975); Cowley v.
Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884); Werfel v. Fitzgerald, 23 A.D.2d 306, 312, 260
N.Y.S.2d 791, 798 (1965); 2 T. Cooley, supra note 59, at 931.
80. See United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364, 372 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 978 (1963); cf. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 569
(1976) (probability of the evil that pre-trial publicity will work must be shown with a
degree of certainty to justify the imposition of a prior restraint). During appellate
court review, courts must be mindful that "[iut is not required ... that the jurors be
totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved... . [Slcarcely any of those best
qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the
merits of the case." Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961). Rather, the court must
search for "those strong and deep impressions [in a juror] which will close the mind
against the testimony that may be offered in opposition to them, which will combat
that testimony, and resist its force .... " United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51
(C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g) (Marshall, C.J.).
81. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1961); see Chandler v. Florida, 449
U.S. 560, 575 (1981) ("the appropriate safeguard against... prejudice is the defend-
ant's right to demonstrate that the media's coverage of his case-be it printed or
broadcast-compromised the ability of the particular jury that heard the case to
adjudicate fairly").
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much information regarding the investigation and prosecution of the
accused that his verdict was not based solely on evidence adduced at
the trial,82 a new trial should be ordered. Furthermore, it is clear that
the burden of making this showing is on the defendant.8 3
Appellate review is not the sole means by which the defendant's fair
trial right is protected. The trial judge is empowered, and indeed
required, to root out all traces of unfairness in the first instance. 84
Among the vehicles for his meeting this obligation is voir dire-an
examination of prospective jurors to determine their fitness to serve as
jurors. s5 Others include continuation, change of venue, sequestration
and admonitions to the jurors.88
The effectiveness of these measures has been recognized and their
use actively encouraged. 7  Indeed, the failure to effectively employ
82. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 P.S. 454, 462 (1907).
83. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878). There are some circum-
stances that are inherently unfair, however, and the defendant need not prove any
actual bias. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (extensive inflam-
matory pre-trial publicity); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (key witnesses
speaking to jurors); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (televising confession
made without aid of counsel); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (press releases of
defendant's confessions to prior murders). In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the
Supreme Court seemed to hold that the televising of a trial denies the defendant a fair
trial because "it is deemed inherently lacking in due process." Id. at 542-43. In the
1980 Term, however, the Court in Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), held
that the Constitution does not prohibit a state from experimenting with the state-
authorized program of televising trials. Id. at 583. The Court distinguished, but did
not overrule, Estes. Id. at 570-74. Two Justices, White and Stewart, in their concur-
ring opinions, asserted that Estes had announced a per se constitutional rule against
the televising of a trial and that therefore Estes should have been overruled, not
distinguished. Id. at 583 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); id. at 587 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
84. Because events occurring prior to trial must be considered by a reviewing
court in evaluating the fairness of a trial, the trial judge may find it necessary to take
measures well before the date of trial in order to preserve any hope of a fair trial. See
Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965) ("Pretrial can create a major problem for the
defendant in a criminal case. Indeed, it may be more harmful than publicity during
the trial for it may well set the community opinion as to guilt or innocence.").
85. Any person found to be predisposed regarding the guilt or innocence of the
accused, or unfit for any other reason, should be dismissed from service. See A.B.A.
Advisory Committee on Fair Trial and Free Press, Standards Relating to Fair Trial
and Free Press 130-34 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as Standards].
86. Should the judge, upon voir dire, determine that there is extensive bias in the
community against the defendant, he should order a change of venue or a continua-
tion. Standards, supra note 85, at 119-28. A showing of actual bias in individual
jurors is unnecessary. Id. at 123. In cases in which there is likely to be much
prejudicial publicity, the judge may sequester the jury on his own motion or that of
either party. Id. at 141. The judge should also admonish jurors not to watch or listen
to any news reports concerning the trial and not to discuss the case amongst themsel-
ves during the course of the trial. Id. at 144.
87. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 358 (1966); Beck v. Washington,
369 U.S. 541, 557 (1962).
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these devices can be reversible error.18 It would be naive, however,
to think that these measures, even if liberally used, will always be
effective in ensuring a fair trial to the defendant. With the moderniza-
tion of communication techniques, which bring news of high-interest
trials to homes across the nation, the effectiveness of a change of
venue or a continuation comes into question.89 Sequestration has
always been disfavored as a remedy because it often causes the jurors
inconvenience and annoyance and increases the taxpayers' burden. 0
Even exhaustive voir dire is ineffective in rooting out those prejudices
that the juror himself does not recognize or admit.91
88. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Rideau v. Louisiana,
373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); United States ex rel. Bloeth
v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 372 U.S. 978 (1963).
89. See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 64 nn.42 & 43 (1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 861 (E.D.
Pa. 1980), rev'd, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981); People v. Manson, 61 Cal. App. 3d
102, 177, 132 Cal. Rptr. 265, 310 (1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 (1977); Gannett
Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 380, 372 N.E.2d 544, 550, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756,
762 (1977), aff'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Committee on the Operation of the Jury
System, Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free
Press-Fair Trial" Issue, 45 F.R.D. 391, 413 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Report];
Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against Adverse Prss Cover-
age, 13 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 20 (1971); Comment, Gagging the Press in Criminal
Trials, 10 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 608, 617-18 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gagging
the Press]. Furthermore, they both may involve the sacrifice of other precious rights
guaranteed to the accused. United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 833 (3d Cir. 1981)
(Weis, J., concurring and dissenting) ("the frequent invocation of customary "reme-
dies' for prejudicial publicity neglects to recognize that their use may deprive the
defendant of valued constitutional rights, such as a speedy trial, a jury of the
vicinage, or a jury representing a fair cross section of the population"); Standards,
supra note 85, at 75 ("A continuance ... may require the defendant to sacrifice his
right to a speedy trial. . . . A change of venue may also require the sacrifice of state
or federal constitutional rights."); Report, supra, at 413 ("some of [these protective
measures] will involve additional complications such as, in the case of a protracted
continuance, prejudice to the right of a defendant to a speedy trial and the interest of
the public in the prompt administration of justice").
90. See Standards, supra note 85, at 75; Stanga, supra note 89, at 23; Gagging
the Press, supra note 89, at 617.
91. Standards, supra note 85, at 75; Stanga, supra note 89, at 2; Gagging the
Press, supra note 89, at 617 & n.50; see Crawford v. United States, 212 U.S. 183, 196
(1909) ("Bias or prejudice is such an elusive condition of the mind that it is most
difficult, if not impossible, to always recognize its existence, and it might exist in the
mind of one ... who was quite positive that he had no bias, and said that he was
perfectly able to decide the question wholly uninfluenced by anything but the
evidence."); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1952) ("One
cannot assume that the average juror is so endowed with a sense of detachment, so
clear in his introspective perception of his own mental processes, that he may
confidently exclude even the unconscious influence of his preconceptions as to proba-
ble guilt, engendered by a pervasive pre-trial publicity."); Comment, Fair Trial v.
Free Press: The Psychological Effect of Pre-Trial Publicity on the Juror's Ability to be
Impartial: A Plea for Reform, 38 S. Cal. L. Rev. 672, 680 (1965) ("Just as a person is
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In light of these pitfalls, it becomes clear that the duty of the trial
judge extends not only to negating and balancing the effects of existing
prejudice, but also to preventing, whenever possible, the occurrence
of circumstances that create prejudice. 2 Trial judges must heed the
Supreme Court's admonition that "it is precisely because reversal is
such an extreme remedy, and is employed in only the rarest cases, that
our criminal justice system permits, and even encourages, trial judges
to be overcautious in ensuring that a defendant will receive a fair
trial. ' 93 One way of adhering to this precept would be to prevent the
broadcasting of evidence which so strongly implicates defendants that
its broadcast may prejudicially influence prospective or present jurors.
C. The Influence of Tape Evidence
on Viewers and Listeners
In the usual case in which prejudicial publicity has resulted in an
unfair trial, the biases have been caused by inflammatory or otherwise
prejudicial information printed in the newspapers. In the famous case
of Sheppard v. Maxwell,94 massive amounts of information concern-
ing the investigation of a murder and the primary suspect, Dr. Sam
Sheppard, were reported in the newspapers. Daily headlines linked
Sheppard with the crime and made much of his refusal to take a lie-
detector test.95 The Court reversed Sheppard's conviction because
hostile feelings toward the doctor pervaded the trial court environ-
ment. 6 The case is a classic example of how prejudicial information
in written form can lead, when widely publicized, to an unfair trial.
not conscious of the mechanism by which he perceives ... he is not conscious of the
mechanism by which he selects, excludes, or distorts that which is perceived."
(footnote omitted)) [hereinafter cited as Fair Trial-Free Press].
92. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); CBS v.
Young, 522 F.2d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 1975); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d
370, 380, 372 N.E.2d 544, 549-50, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756, 762 (1977), af'fd, 443 U.S. 368
(1979); Stanga, supra note 89, at 39 n.224, 68. For instance, the trial judge may close
a pre-trial hearing and withhold temporarily the transcript thereof to prevent the
dissemination of possibly prejudicial information. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368, 392-93 (1979). Of course, what the judge may not do is prevent the press
from disseminating information it already has in its possession. See Landmark Com-
munications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v.
District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539
(1976); CBS v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975).
93. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379 n.6 (1979).
94. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
95. Id. at 338. Other examples of the publicity regarding the case include the
publishing of the names and addresses of the veniremen, which caused many of them
to receive anonymous phone calls, the televising of the coroner's inquest at which
Sheppard was denied counsel, and the printing of photos of trial exhibits and the
jurors in the newspapers. Id. at 337-42.
96. Id. at 363.
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Prejudice is not, however, generated solely by what is printed and
read. Television and radio broadcasts are even more capable of creat-
ing bias; they pose risks not encountered with the written word. The
case of Rideau v. Louisiana9 7 illustrates that even television broadcasts
of accurate information, information essentially the same as that sub-
sequently adduced at trial, can be so powerful as to be presumptively
prejudicial.9 8 In Rideau, an interrogation of the defendant, during
which he confessed to the crime, was filmed and then shown on
television. The Supreme Court held that "due process of law in this
case required a trial before a jury drawn from a community of people
who had not seen and heard Rideau's televised 'interview.' "99 It
determined that the television broadcast "in a very real sense was
Rideau's trial,"100 after which any court proceeding in that commu-
nity would be a "hollow formality."10' It was the broadcast itself,
with its powerful effects on its viewers, that was inherently prejudi-
cial.
There is little dispute that, compared with printed information,
information that is broadcast will both reach a greater number of
potential jurors and have a greater impact. 02 Because information
97. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
98. Id. at 727. Three of the jurors had seen all or part of the televised confession.
While the text of oral and written confessions was admitted into evidence at trial, the
film was marked as an exhibit but was not introduced into evidence. Id. at 730
(Clark, J., dissenting); cf. Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 1952)
(The televising of Senate hearings prior to the trial of the defendant caused prejudice
because "[n]one of the testimony of witnesses heard at the committee hearing ran the
gauntlet of defense cross-examination. Nor was the published evidence tempered,
challenged, or minimized by evidence offered by the accused.").
99. 373 U.S. at 727.
100. Id. at 726 (emphasis in original).
101. Id.
102. See In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 824 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers,
635 F.2d 945, 953 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654
F.2d 423, 432 (5th Cir. 1981) ("General pretrial publicity and any attendant preju-
dice to a defendant's rights before disclosure and rebroadcast of the tapes would not
necessarily be the same as what may obtain in a second trial following public
broadcast."); United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 860 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("The
viewer of videotape becomes virtually a participant in the events portrayed."), rev'd,
648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981). The American public "has developed a sense of comfort
and security with the cinematic process." Perlman, Seeing is Believing, Trial, June
1981, at 34, 34. Further, one commentator has noted that "95% of what a person
sees on television he believes." Thornton, Expanding Video Tape Techniques in
Pretrial and Trial Advocacy, 9 Forum 105, 105 (1973). Videotape testimony has even
begun to replace live testimony in some cases, as it has been suggested that "jurors
were more interested and involved in the taped testimony than in the same informa-
tion presented live." G. Miller & N. Fontes, Videotape on Trial: A View from the
Jury Box 92 (1979). Furthermore, the viewer of a film, while likely after a period of
time to forget the details of what he saw, will not forget his general impressions, and
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received by means of a tape is thus more influential, the potential for
prejudice is greater. The only way to ensure that prejudice will not
occur is to prohibit the copying and dissemination of tapes that jeop-
ardize the defendant's fair trial right.
II. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
A. The Constitutional Right of Access
Once video or audio tapes have been introduced into evidence at an
open criminal trial, they become part of the public record. As such,
they should be available to the public under the common-law right to
inspect. 0 3 In addition, because the public has a right of access to the
information brought out in criminal trials,10 4 there is arguably a first
amendment right to inspect the tapes as well. 0 5 Thus, when a judge
is presented with a request by the media to copy tapes, the first
question he must resolve is whether a denial of the request would
indeed, will even "reinforce what [he] remember[s] of the general idea." R. Flesch,
The Art of Clear Thinking 166 (1969) (emphasis in original), "Thus, the circum-
stance that prospective jurors stated they could not recall particulars did not negate
the strong possibility that they had formed and retained some general opinions about
what they had seen and heard." United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 155 (D.C.
Cir. 1976) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 933 (1977). One reason for this greater impact is that a person must use
more of his senses when he hears the words being spoken and sees the visual image
than when he reads. M. McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man
314 (1965); see Perlman, supra, at 36 ("it is an established and documented fact that
learning and retention are increased significantly through visual communication").
When the Watergate defendants moved for a change of venue in the trial court, they
appended to their papers a public survey that evaluated the impact of pre-trial
publicity in the case. 559 F.2d at 143 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Asked which medium had the greatest influence on them, 58 % of
the subjects of the national poll responded that television was the most influential,
and only 37% responded that newspapers were most influential. Id. at 179 (MacKin-
non, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Sindlinger Affidavit). In that
there are any doubts about the greater effects of television broadcasting, they are
only with respect to their precise extent and not to their existence. In the case that has
become a cause celebre and has been preceded by heavy publicity adverse to the
defendant, "[t]he conscious or unconscious effect that this may have on the juror'sjudgment cannot be evaluated, but experience indicates that it is not only possible
but highly probable that it will have a direct bearing on his vote as to guilt or
innocence." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545 (1965); cf. id. at 550 ("[W]e cannot
afford the luxury of saying that, because [the effects of televising a trial on the jurors,
judge, witnesses and the defendant] are difficult of ascertainment in particular cases,
they must be ignored. Nor are they 'purely hypothetical.' . . . They are effects that
may, and in some combination almost certainly will, exist in any case in which
television is injected into the trial process.").
103. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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interrupt the flow of information to the public, thereby creating a
first amendment issue. 106
The tapes played in the Watergate, Abscam and Brilab cases' 07
were all played to the jury in open court. All in attendance were
permitted to see or hear the tapes, and at least in a few of the trials,
were allowed to follow along with printed transcripts. The transcripts
were widely reproduced in the print media. The press had been
permitted to fully report what it observed in the courtroom, and the
public was kept informed about the events of these historic cases. 0 s
Thus, it would seem that because the flow of information was not
restricted, no first amendment right had been infringed. The argu-
ment was made by the press in these cases, however, that there was
information contained on the tapes that was not in the printed tran-
script. The press argued that the inferences to be drawn from seeing
the actions of the defendants, hearing the inflections and emphases in
their voices, and detecting the pauses in their speech would give the
public a greater understanding of the events.'10 Further, because
some of the defendants were elected public officials, the press claimed
that there was even greater reason to make this information available
to the public." 0 Thus, the press urged that the first amendment
106. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978).
107. See supra notes 10-11.
108. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; cf. Stein, Criminal Trial by Paper
Deposition vs. the Right of Confrontation, 25 B.B.J., Apr. 1981, at 18, 23-24 (paper
testimony does not accurately reflect live testimony, omitting the "wordless lan-
guage" of intonations, quivered voice, demeanor and posture).
110. In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 614 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United
States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 822 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d
945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980); see Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 141 (3d Cir. 1981);
Oxnard Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 83, 91-92 (Ct. App. 1968);
Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 381, 372 N.E.2d 544, 550, 401
N.Y.S.2d 756, 763 (1977), aff'd, 443 U.S. 368 (1979); Payne v. Staunton, 55 W. Va.
202, 216-17, 46 S.E. 927, 933 (1904) (Dent, J., dissenting). But see Gannett Co. v.
DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 443 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) ("It is also true, however, that as the public interest intensifies, so does
the potential for prejudice."); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 545 (1965) (When a case
becomes a cause celebre, "[t]he whole community, including prospective jurors,
becomes interested in all the morbid details surrounding it. The approaching trial
immediately assumes an important status. . . . Every juror carries with him into the
jury box these solemn facts and thus increases the chance of prejudice that is present
in every criminal case."); United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 863 (E.D. Pa.
1980) ("There is ... a growing public awareness that when a person becomes a
totally public figure [because of national or worldwide exposure], there are trade-offs
which benefit neither the public, its institutions, nor the individual."), rev'd, 648
F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981). The fact that these defendants are political figures also
means that greater publicity regarding their trials may bring about penalties not
prescribed by law upon the defendants. For example, the relief of a jury's acquittal
would be considerably diminished if the broadcast of the tapes ruined the defendant's
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required release of the tapes so that the public could be completely
informed.
The Supreme Court, in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,ttl
considered this argument, however, and unequivocally rejected it.
The Court conceded there might be some extra information that
would "arguably" flow from the hearing of the Watergate tapes. 112
Whatever the volume of this extra information, the Court dismissed
its value and the need for its dissemination, concluding that there was
"no question of a truncated flow of information to the public." 1 13
Furthermore, the Court said that the press's argument stemmed
from a misreading of a prior case.114 In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v.
Cohn,"' the Court had held that a state could not prohibit the press
from accurately publishing information it had already obtained from
public records that were open to public inspection."6 The case nei-
ther stands for the proposition that the press or public is guaranteed
access to the information contained in public records, 1 7 nor that there
is a right of physical access 18-meaning the right to copy-to evi-
dence brought out in court. The Nixon Court made clear that Cox
Broadcasting did not establish a first amendment right of access to the
tapes, much less a right to copy them.
Despite the holding of Nixon, it remains uncertain whether the
constitutional right of access includes the right to copy. One line of
thought is that Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia" 10 effectively
overruled Nixon, in that the first amendment right to attend a trial
should not only be extended to the right to inspect, but also to the
political career. Furthermore, Congressman Jenrette argued that the entire Abscam
investigation was tainted by political motivation. In re National Broadcasting Co.,
653 F.2d 609, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1981). These were among the reasons why the district
court in Criden denied the copying request. 501 F. Supp. at 863. That court wrote
that broadcasting the tapes was similar to parading the defendants through the
streets. In addition, the court said that the balance between the public's interest in
access to news regarding criminal trials and the dignity of the accused "would be
destroyed by intentionally creating a situation in which the defendant's initial mis-
conduct is graphically portrayed in every living room in America." Id. at 860. But see
Murphy v. FBI, 490 F. Supp. 1138, 1139 (D.D.C. 1980), in which the plaintiff
sought disclosure of tapes prior to indictment to ensure a fair re-election campaign.
111. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
112. Id. at 602; accord United States v. Ming Sen Shiue, 504 F. Supp. 360, 363
(D. Minn. 1980).
113. 435 U.S. at 609.
114. Id. at 608-09.
115. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
116. Id. at 495.
117. Id. at 496 n.26.
118. 435 U.S. at 608-09.
119. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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right to copy.120 The Fifth Circuit in Belo Broadcasting Corp. v.
Clark,'2' decided a year after Richmond, responded to this view.
The thrust of the press's argument in Belo was that because of the
policy reasons cited in Richmond that support the public's right to an
open trial,12 2 the interpretation of Cox Broadcasting that was rejected
by Nixon was revived. 23 The Belo court noted, however, that there
was nothing in Richmond that expressly contradicted Justice Powell's
specific language denying constitutional status to the right to copy. 
2 4
It held that "[o]n the basis of comments general in nature [in Rich-
mond] and addressed to a different problem, the Supreme Court will
not here be presumed to have abandoned an only recently stated
principle [in Nixon]."12 5
Further, to the extent that the press's argument might have been
based on the claim that because copying was denied, the trial itself
was less than public, the argument must be regarded as flawed. The
Nixon Court had said that the requirement of a public trial is fully
satisfied when members of the public are allowed to sit in the court-
room, observe all that occurs, and then report their observations
freely to others. 2 6 The public trial right does not mean that every
member of the public must be allowed to view the proceedings in
their homes.12 7
B. The Common-Law Right to Copy
Assuming that the right to copy was not accorded constitutional
protection by Richmond, the issue arises of whether the common-law
right to copy judicial records includes records that are non-documen-
tary. The Court in Nixon merely assumed, for the sake of argument,
that it did, but intimated no position on the issue.'2 In the D.C.
120. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
121. 654 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1981).
122. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
123. 654 F.2d at 428. The Third Circuit in United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814
(3d Cir. 1981), made the same argument as did the press in Belo.
124. 654 F.2d at 428-29.
125. Id. at 428.
126. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610 (1978).
127. See United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 858 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd,
648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981).
128. 435 U.S. at 599 & nn.10-11. The Court felt it could make this assumption
because it ultimately did not decide the case on the basis of the common-law right to
inspect and copy. Id. at 603. Rather, the Court concluded that the Presidential
Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note (1976), was the
"congressionally prescribed avenue of public access" and therefore should control the
release of the tapes for public consumption. 435 U.S. at 605-06. That Act empowered
the Administrator of General Services to decide which of the recordings were of
historical value to be kept in the Archives, and which were personal and should be
returned to former President Nixon. Id.
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Circuit's opinion in that case, United States v. Mitchell,12 Chief Judge
Bazelon reasoned that because two courts had applied the right to
copy to magnetic computer tape, 130 it should also be applied to audio
tapes.131 The Third Circuit in United States v. Criden132 also ruled
that the right was applicable to the tapes,133 but cited for support a
case which only held that one seeking to copy documentary records
could use more advanced techniques to copy. 34 The Belo court, as
had the Court in Nixon, assumed arguendo that the right applied to
the tapes. 135  The Second Circuit, in United States v. Myers, 30 also
said the right applies, citing only to Mitchell. 37 The D.C. Circuit, in
In re National Broadcasting Co.,' 38 citing Myers, agreed. 13
Despite the Supreme Court's reluctance to answer the question, and
the misuse by some of the circuit courts of precedent, 140 there is no
reason not to extend the right to copy judicial records to video and
audio tapes. They have been shown in open court and are thereby
part of the public record. Although some courts have noted the greater
danger to the integrity of non-documentary records because they can
more easily be erased or destroyed,' 4 1 adequate precautionary mea-
sures would protect them. Thus, the better rule is that the common-
law right to copy does apply to these tapes.
The next stage of the analysis is to determine the strength of this
common-law right to copy. Justice Powell wrote in Nixon that there is
a presumption, "however gauged," in favor of copying judicial rec-
ords. 142 The Myers court held that the right to copy tapes contempo-
raneously with their being played in court should be denied only upon
129. 551 F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub non. Nixon v.
Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
130. Menge v. City of Manchester, 113 N.H. 533, 311 A.2d 116 (1973); Ortiz v.
Jaramillo, 82 N.M. 445, 483 P.2d 500 (1971).
131. 551 F.2d at 1258 n.21.
132. 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981).
133. Id. at 823-24.
134. Id. (citing Moore v. Board of Freeholders, 76 N.J. Super. 396, 184 A.2d 748
(App. Div. 1962)). A case in accord with Moore is People ex rel. Gibson v. Peller, 34
Ill. App. 2d 372, 375, 181 N.E.2d 376, 378 (1962).
135. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 429 (5th Cir. 1981).
136. 635 F.2d 945 (2d Cir. 1980).
137. Id. at 950.
138. 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
139. Id. at 612 & n.13.
140. See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1265 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(MacKinnon, J., dissenting), revd on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Guarriello v. Benson, 90 N.J. Super.
233, 241, 217 A.2d 22, 27 (Law Div. 1966).
142. 435 U.S. at 602. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens labelled the pre-
sumption in favor of access "normal." Id. at 615 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the showing of "the most compelling circumstances."'14 3  The Na-
tional Broadcasting court, adhering to the standard it had set earlier
in Mitchell, said that such copying could be denied only when " 'jus-
tice so requires.' "'144 The court in Criden labelled the presumption
"strong."' 145 The Belo court, however, said that the presumption
should not be gauged in terms of its strength; rather, it was merely one
factor to be considered when deciding whether or not to grant ac-
cess. 
14 6
The standards erected by the Second and D.C. Circuits have been
appropriately criticized as creating constitutional protection for a
right to which Nixon had expressly denied such protection two years
earlier. 147 The use of the word "compelling" suggests the tests used to
protect the first amendment rights of free exercise of religion and free
speech.148 The Belo court pointed out that Nixon supplied no founda-
tion for "erecting such stout barriers against those opposing ac-
cess." ' 49  Because after Nixon the right to copy should not be given
such constitutional protection as that afforded by the Second and
D.C. Circuits, the only remaining conflict is that between Criden's
"'strong" presumption and Belo's "one factor to be considered." What-
ever the difference between these two standards, however, it becomes
insignificant when the presumption is balanced against the threatened
infringement of the constitutional right to a fair trial.
C. Balancing the Fair Trial Right Against
the Right to Copy
Given the existence of the presumption in favor of granting a re-
quest to copy judicial records, the court's role is to determine whether
there exist reasons why the presumption should not hold. The primary
argument offered in opposition to these requests to copy has been that
143. 635 F.2d at 952. In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 36S (1979), the
Supreme Court was asked to announce a rule that for pre-trial criminal hearings
closure could only occur when "strictly and inescapably necessary." Id. at 378.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, wrote that -[a] rule of such apparent
inflexibility could prejudice defendants' rights and disserve society's interest in the
fair and prompt disposition of criminal trials." Id. at 399 (Powell, J., concurring).
144. 653 F.2d at 613 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 12.52, 1260
(D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub norm. Nixon v. Warner Communica-
tions, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978)); accord C. v. C., 320 A.2d 717, 724 (Del. 1974).
145. 648 F.2d at 829.
146. 654 F.2d at 434.
147. Id. at 433-34; United States v. Ming Sen Shiue, 504 F. Supp. 360, 362 n.I (D.
Minn. 1980); United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 856-57 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
rev'd, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981); see United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 830-31
(3d Cir. 1981) (Weis, J., concurring and dissenting).
148. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (free exercise of
religion); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (free speech).
149. 654 F.2d at 434.
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broadcast of the tapes will impair the chances of the defendants to
receive a fair trial. 50 Although the issue was not present in the
Watergate tapes case by the time it reached the Supreme Court, the
circuit court concluded that "the 'risk of causing possible prejudice' at
a hypothetical second trial does not justify infringing" the common-
law right.15' In Criden, it was also determined that the prediction of
prejudice was "hypothetical."'' 5 2  The Myers court stated that the
likelihood of prejudice to the present defendants, either during the
present trial or during any possible retrial, or to other Abscam defend-
ants who might also be implicated on the tapes, was exaggerated,
primarily because the information contained on them was already
disseminated. 5 3 National Broadcasting not only said that the chance
of prejudice was slim, but also noted that the chance of a retrial was
speculative. 54
The argument that the potential for prejudice is speculative derives
its support from the observation that the tapes are almost uniformly
deemed admissible evidence, 15- and that any present or potential juror
will either have already seen the tapes in court or would see them
150. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
151. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (emphasis in
original) (quoting lower court), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). The court believed that the release of
the tapes might actually decrease prejudice, because dramatic re-enactments of the
events heard on the tapes would no longer be necessary. Id. at 1262 n.45. The court
also noted that the arguments favoring release of these particular tapes were but-
tressed by the national significance of the Watergate trial. Id. at 1265. Circuit Judge
MacKinnon dissented in the case, believing that release of the tapes might present
risks to the integrity of the tapes themselves. Further, until the need for the tapes as
evidence had passed, "courts and the Government should be concerned that they do
not become a party to manufacturing presumptive prejudice against defendants." Id.
at 1265 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Responding to the majority's
observation that a retrial of these defendants was only hypothetical, he wrote that
"[a] significant reduction in the possibility of prejudice to a fair trial should not cause
a court concerned with constitutional rights to ignore the possibility of prejudice that
remains." Id. at 1265-66 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted). Interestingly, Judge MacKinnon wrote the unanimous opinion in In re
National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609 (D.C. Cir. 1981), just five years later, In
which he did not mention his earlier dissenting opinion.
152. 648 F.2d at 827.
153. 635 F.2d at 953.
154. 653 F.2d at 616.
155. The admissibility of the tapes as evidence was only contested in United States
v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981). For
a discussion of the issues involved, see id. at 861-63. As for the admissibility issue In
the other main cases, see In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 614 (D.C.
Cir. 1981); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir. 1980); and United
States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1255 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub
nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
[Vol. 50
BROADCASTING TAPE EVIDENCE
should he be picked to sit at trial.'5 6  The tapes that were involved in
all of these cases either showed the defendant committing the acts for
which he was charged or recorded his voice in conversations discus-
sing the crime. They have constituted the primary evidence against
the defendant. 5 7 Thus, it would appear that broadcast of the tapes,
which are accurate and pertinent, could not be considered prejudi-
cial.
In considering the prejudicial effect on the potential juror, how-
ever, it is important to recognize that the tapes are not the sole
evidence offered at the trial. In addition, both sides at trial are able to
offer witnesses to explain the context and the meaning of the words
and actions on the tapes. More importantly, the defendant has the
opportunity to cross-examine those testifying against him. ss Thus,
the jury receives a good deal of information beyond the tapes them-
selves, allowing them to put the tapes in their proper perspective.
Conversely, there is no such accompanying information to help the
viewer when the tapes are broadcast on television. Rather, he is
exposed to raw evidence without any explanations 5 9 except the poten-
tially biased commentaries of newscasters. 1 0  Moreover, while the
information that is being disseminated is the same as that contained in
the reprinted transcripts, it is conveyed by a much more powerful
medium.16 1 Therefore, the danger is that the prospective juror w.ill
156. See United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 953 (2d Cir. 1980).
157. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1981); In re
National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
158. See Brief for Petitioner at 54, Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435
U.S. 589 (1978) ("The tapes were perhaps the most critical evidence in the criminal
case, and it was essential that they be considered by a jury only under appropriate
instructions, only as a whole and not in selections, and only in conjunction with all
the other evidence in the case, including the witnesses' explanations of the context,
the circumstances, and the intended meaning of each statement.").
159. That the tapes are accurate and are not inflammatory does not mean that
they cannot be prejudicial. Standards, supra note 85, at 64 ("even exposure to
accurate information can cause" prejudice (emphasis in original)); Gagging the Press,
supra note 89, at 616 ("certain admissible evidence may be unduly prejudicial when
presented by the press outside of court" (footnote omitted)); Fair Trial-Free Press,
supra note 91, at 684 ("a report may be accurate and fair in what it relates, but...
the failure to present other facts explaining incriminating evidence can distort the
significance and meaning of facts correctly reported"). Furthermore, as former Presi-
dent Nixon argued, the broadcast of the tapes should not be considered accurate if
only short excerpts are played by the media. To be fully accurate, the tapes would
have to be aired in their entirety. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S.
589, 601 (1978).
160. See United States v. Criden, 501 F. Supp. 854, 861 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
rev'd, 648 F.2d 814 (3d Cir. 1981). See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 571-72 (1965)
(Warren, C.J., concurring), for an example of the types of comments made by
newscasters during the televising of a trial.
161. See supra note 102.
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be significantly influenced by the broadcast of the tapes and will form
what may well be a deep impression regarding the guilt of the accused
without possession of all the facts. 162 Such an impression could cause
him to disregard or distort any evidence ultimately presented at trial
that is contrary to that initial impression.l6 3 When a juror views or
listens to the tapes, he effectively becomes a witness to the charged
crime. 64 Should the viewer then become a juror at the defendant's
162. See Standards, supra note 85, at 62 ("people tend to form beliefs on a
minimum of information"); Stanga, supra note 89, at 5 ("a person's first exposure to
information about an issue will shape his future attitudes"); Fair Trial-Free Press,
supra note 91, at 677 ("A person cannot say to himself, 'Hold off any interpretation
until you collect all the facts.' "). There can be little doubt that the formation of
these beliefs is inimical to a sense of justice and inhibitive of the truth-finding process.
See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) ("The theory of our system is
that the conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and
argument in open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or
public print."); Gagging the Press, supra note 89, at 615 ("courts have long followed
the principle that the truth best emerges if the jury considers only evidence presented
in open court" (footnote omitted)). Furthermore, the deep impressions that may be
formed are the type that should disqualify a person from jury service. United States
v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692g) ("those strong and deep
impressions [in a juror] which will close the mind against the testimony that may be
offered in opposition to them. . . do constitute a sufficient objection to him"); Singer
v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 24 (Fla. 1959) ("It is not enough that an opinion will readily
yield to the evidence, for evidence of innocence is not required to be presented by the
accused.").
163. Standards, supra note 85, at 64 ("unless [accurate information] is complete in
every respect, with all the necessary nuances and shadings, it seems likely to instill a
belief that will be hard to shake and that will color the juror's perception of the
evidence adduced in court"); Fair Trial-Free Press, supra note 91, at 677, 682-83
("lack of related facts can distort the significance and meaning of the totally correct
facts . . . data which conforms to a belief will be emphasized and data opposed will
be distorted or excluded . . . the juror will not give the defendant's testimony due
consideration, since that testimony is contrary to the juror's belief").
164. United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (MacKinnon,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (if jurors saw the Senate Watergate
hearings in which some of the defendants had committed perjury, one of the crimes
for which they were being tried, they "were actual witnesses to the charged crime, a
frequent cause for disqualification as a juror" (emphasis in original)), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 933 (1977). Judge MacKinnon compared the televised hearings to the
situation in Ridegu v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), in which a televised confession
was in effect the defendant's trial. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
The majority in Haldeman disagreed with Judge MacKinnon's observation and dis-
tinguished Rideau on two grounds. First, while in Rideau the viewer of the confes-
sion was well aware of what he was seeing, the viewer of the testimony before the
Senate Subcommittee would not be aware, without the knowledge of extraneous
facts, that he was hearing perjured statements. Id. at 62 n.35. Second, while Rideau's
confession was made without the advice of an attorney, the Watergate defendants
who testified before the Subcommittee did have the aid of counsel. Id. Whatever the
merit of these distinctions, it should be noted that, in the cases involving the release
of tapes for copying, any viewer of the tapes on television would be well aware that
he was seeing the charged crime, an act done without the aid of counsel. Thus, these
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trial, he would deny the defendant his right to be presumed inno-
cent. 165 Finally, the defendant's right to cross-examine the prosecu-
tion's witnesses at trial would be undermined because such cross-
examination would not coincide with the juror's first exposure to the
tapes.
166
Dangers of prejudice exist not only with respect to potential jurors,
but as to present jurors as well. While courts have tended to focus on
the possibility of there being a retrial,1 67 they have overlooked the risks
posed by broadcasting the tapes during the pending trial. There is
danger of prejudice if the jurors see or hear the tapes on television
during the trial, even after seeing them in court.168 In the event that
an unsequestered juror disregards the judge's admonitions to not
watch news reports of the trial, he will most likely see replays of only
the most incriminating portions, usually with accompanying com-
mentary from a newscaster. Such repetition of the most damaging
parts of the tapes may over-emphasize them to the juror' 6 9-certainly
cases are on the Rideau side of the distinction. Indeed, the viewer is even more of a
witness here than in the Rideau situation, because only a confession of the crime was
involved there.
165. See Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1978), for a discussion of the
presumption of innocence, which requires that "one accused of a crime [be] entitled
to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence intro-
duced at trial." Id. at 485. Accord Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)
("The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the
undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation
of the administration of our criminal law."); see Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729-30
(1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("How can fallible men and women reach a
disinterested verdict based exclusively on what they heard in court when, before they
entered the jury box, their minds were saturated by press and radio for months
preceding by matter designed to establish the guilt of the accused."); Delaney v.
United States, 199 F.2d 107, 114 (1st Cir. 1952) ("[the defendant] would be put
under a heavy handicap in establishing his innocence at the impending trial" should
the jury be composed of people who saw the televised congressional hearings related
to the defendant's indictment). See generally Abramovsky, Juror Safety: The Pre-
sumption of Innocence and Meaningful Voir Dire in Federal Criminal Prosecu-
tions-Are They Endangered Species?, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 30, 31-39 (1981). But see
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 195 (1952) (not a denial of the presumption of
innocence to release the details of a confession prior to trial, especially in light of the
fact that the confession was introduced into evidence at the trial).
166. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965); Delaney v. United
States, 199 F.2d 107, 113 (1st Cir. 1952).
167. See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
168. Stanga, supra note 89, at 23 ("[T]he gravity of the evil may be greater when
prejudicial publicity occurs during a trial, for the accused may no longer resort to
pretrial protective procedure." (footnote omitted)).
169. Cf. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 546 (1965) ("[Unsequestered jurors] would
also be subjected to re-enactment and emphasis of the selected parts of the proceed-
ings which the requirements of the broadcasters determined would be telecast and
would be subconsciously influenced the more by that testimony. Moreover, they
would be subjected to the broadest commentary and criticism .... ").
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he should not be exposed to the commentary. Thus, it is clear that as
to both present and potential jurors, the broadcast of these tapes
carries with it the significant risk that some prejudice will result. 170
The Belo court, while admitting that the potential of prejudice was
speculative, countered that the prognostication that no prejudice
would result was equally speculative.'1  Thus, "[i]t is better to err, if
err we must, on the side of generosity in the protection of a defend-
ant's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury."'172  The court
concluded that any risk to the fair trial right was enough to deny the
right to copy. 173
No one can predict what the precise effect will be once the tapes
are broadcast. The broadcasters in Belo argued that unless it could be
shown that prejudice would certainly result, release should be
granted.1 4 This is not, however, the burden that should be imposed
on the defendant. He is not trying to have a conviction overturned, in
which case a showing of actual prejudice is necessary. 17 Rather, he is
at a stage of the trial when he is trying to prevent prejudice from
occurring. Such should be the primary concern of the trial judge as
well. 76 The defendant's burden should be only to show that there is a
reasonable likelihood that prejudice will result.
The proper question, therefore, is whether there is such a reason-
able likelihood of prejudice as to negate the presumption in favor of
release, however it is measured. This question involves a conflict
between "an undeniably important but nonconstitutional right of
physical access to courtroom exhibits and a defendant's due process
right to a fair trial."'' 7  Phrased in this way, the answer should be
clear. In rather stark terms, once the right to copy is exercised and the
tapes are broadcast, there is a significant decrease in the possibility
that the defendant will receive a fair trial. Given the threat to this
precious constitutional right, which the Supreme Court in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia1 8 said was superior to even a first
amendment right,77 the presumption in favor of copying should not
hold and the common-law right must yield. 180
170. See id. at 546-47.
171. 654 F.2d at 431.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 431, 433; accord United States v. Marcello, No. 80-274, slip op. at 5
(E.D. La. Dec 1, 1981); Hearst Corp. v. Vogt, 62 A.D.2d 840, 842, 406 N.Y.S.2d
567, 569 (1978).
174. 654 F.2d at 431.
175. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
176. United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1209 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 968 (1978); see Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 (1966).
177. Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 432 (5th Cir. 1981).
178. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
179. Id. at 564 (plurality opinion). But see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 561 (1976).
180. It is self-evident that when a constitutional right is in conflict with only a
common-law right, the latter must yield. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
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D. The Ineffectiveness of Procedural Alternatives
Despite the fact that prejudice may result from the broadcast of the
tapes, it could be argued that there are ways of protecting the defend-
ant's right to a fair trial other than denying release. While the circuit
court in Mitchell did not address this question, the courts in each of
the Abscam cases stated that the various procedural protective de-
vices, such as voir dire, continuation, change of venue and sequestra-
tion, would be sufficient to balance any prejudice that might result. 81
The Belo court, however, felt that because the right to copy did not
rise to a constitutional level, there was no need to consider use of the
various devices: "That the balance is heavily weighted in favor of
protective measures other than absolute closure of the trial to press or
public .. .does not mean that the same balance prevails when less
compelling rights are asserted by the press." 8 2
Even assuming that the Belo position is incorrect, the effectiveness
of these devices in cases receiving widespread publicity is not guaran-
teed. For example, voir dire, although usually efficient, is not fool-
proof.18 3 The prospective juror may truthfully state during voir dire
that he would be able to render a fair verdict based only on the
evidence adduced at trial. Yet it is quite possible that he may possess a
bias of which he is completely unaware18 4 and still become a juror.
Should a trial judge decide to disqualify all veniremen who saw or
heard any part of the tapes, there exists the possibility of empanelling
a jury that is not composed of a cross-section of the community.8 5
As for the suggested use of a continuation or a change of venue, the
effectiveness of these devices must be questioned, primarily because
the potential media coverage is national. 8 6 In addition, there is no
368, 391-94 (1979) (fair trial right vs. common-law right to attend pre-trial hear-
ings); Belo Broadcasting Corp. v. Clark, 654 F.2d 423, 432 (5th Cir. 1981) (fair trial
right vs. common-law right to copy); In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609,
619-20 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (right of privacy vs. common-law right to copy); United
States v. Ming Sen Shiue, 504 F. Supp. 360, 363 (D. Minn. 1980) (same).
181. See In re National Broadcasting Co., 653 F.2d 609, 617 & n.45 (D.C. Cir.
1981); United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Myers, 635 F.2d 945, 953 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1980).
182. 654 F.2d at 432.
183. For an example of the Supreme Court's less-than-complete confidence in voir
dire, see Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). Despite the fact that the three
jurors who had seen the televised confession of the defendant had said during voir
dire that they could disregard all that they had seen and heard, the Court held that
prejudice against the defendant could be presumed. No showing of actual bias was
necessary. Id. at 724-27; accord Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959) (per
curiam) (ordering new trial because of juror prejudice despite fact that jurors had
said they would not be influenced by news articles).
184. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
185. United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 833 (3d Cir. 1981) (Weis, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
186. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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judicial control over uses of the tapes, such as the timing of the
broadcasts, once they are released.1 87  Consequently, it is doubtful
that use of these devices would aid a defendant in securing an impar-
tial jury.
As for the contention that sequestration would prevent the present
jurors from being exposed to the broadcast of the tapes, as has been
shown, 188 there are drawbacks to sequestration that may very well
make this option unsatisfactory to the defense, the prosecution or the
court. Finally, the judge's admonitions to jurors not to listen to news
reports may also be ineffective. 189
The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that proce-
dural protections may not be effective or desirable in cases of wide-
spread publicity.10 In such cases, if the tapes are broadcast, the
defendant is left only with the hope that none of his jurors will be
biased against him. If they are, he is relegated to procedural protec-
tions of questionable effectiveness. Consequently, it is clear that the
proper time to stem any possible prejudice is before it is allowed to
occur. In the cases that involve requests to copy tapes in evidence, the
trial judge should deny their release until all risk of prejudice to the
current defendants and to those implicated by the tapes has passed.
Only when all rights to appeal are exhausted should the tapes be made
available for copying. 191
187. See United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1263 n.52 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S.
589 (1978). But see Hearst Corp. v. Vogt, 62 A.D.2d 840, 843-44, 406 N.Y.S.2d 567,
570 (1978) (Kane, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I cannot assume
that petitioners would act in a manner incompatible with their professional responsi-
bilities in using the materials sought.").
188. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
189. See Standards, supra note 85, at 75.
190. See supra note 89.
191. See United States v. Mitchell, 397 F. Supp. 186 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd, 551
F.2d 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978). In Mitchell, the request to copy the
tapes came before Judge Sirica after the trial of the Watergate defendants was
completed. He wrote that "[a]bsent some compelling reason, the Court should not
take any action which carries the risk of causing possible prejudice to the rights of the
defendants should a retrial be necessary." Id. at 188; cf. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
443 U.S. 368, 400 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (a transcript of a closed pre-trial
hearing should be made available only "past the time when no prejudice is likely to
result to the defendant or the State from its release"); Reilly v. McKnight, 7 Media L.
Rep. (BNA) 1445, 1446 (N.Y. App. Div. May 21, 1981) (same). The possible conse-
quence of this proposed rule is that the tapes may not be as "newsworthy" if their
broadcast is delayed for what could be two or three years. Gannett Co. v. De-
Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 442 n.17 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("[T]he inherent delay may defeat the purpose of the public-trial
requirement. Later events may crowd news of yesterday's proceeding out of the
public view .... Moreover, an important event, such as a judicial election or the
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CONCLUSION
The common-law right to have immediate access to judicial records
for the purpose of copying is an undeniably important part of the
public's right to know information regarding criminal trials. Impor-
tant though it may be, however, it is not absolute. A trial judge, in his
discretion, may properly decide that there are sufficiently important
concerns that outweigh the presumption in favor of copying records.
When the records are video and audio tapes introduced into evi-
dence at trial, the presumption in favor of release should not apply.
Because there is a reasonable possibility that the broadcast of those
tapes will irreparably harm the accused's right to a fair trial, the
courts as a matter of law should deny the release of the tapes for
copying until the accused is no longer in jeopardy. Courts must take
no action that significantly decreases the chance of a fair trial. The
accused is entitled to his day in court, not a few minutes on the nightly
news.
Willian J. Whelan, III
selection of a prosecuting attorney, may occur when the public is ignorant of the
details of judicial and prosecutorial conduct."); Nebraska Press Assn v. Stuart, 427
U.S. 539, 561 (1976) ("the element of time is not unimportant if press coverage is to
fulfill its traditional function of bringing news to the public promptly"). Of course,
these cases were both addressing the question of keeping all information of the
proceeding from the public. There is no such issue in the release of tapes, as long as
there has been public attendance at the trial. Even withholding all information from
the press and public may be proper if there is the threat of prejudicing the defend-
ant's fair trial right. See, e.g., Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 393 (1979)
("[A]ny denial of access in this case was not absolute but only temporary. Once the
danger of prejudice had dissipated, a transcript of the suppression hearing was made
available. The press and the public then had a full opportunity to scrutinize the
suppression hearing."); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 114 (1st Cir. 1952)
(if congressional hearings must be held. they should be closed, "postponing public
disclosure of the evidence taken for a comparatively brief period until the trial...
could have been concluded").
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